To fight endemic corruption, fraud and crime, Russia is creating a Financial
Counterintelligence(CI) Unit. Many CI specialists believe that such a
unit would need at least 6,000 agents to perform what needs to be done on a national
level. This kind of employment number will be difficult to attain given that many of
the nation's best agents are already joining private firms where the pay is both
constant and better.
As one KGB veteran recently stated, "Anyone who can read and write reasonably well
has left the [police] services for better paying private sector jobs".
Russian Prosecutor-General, Vladimir Ustinov, added his own findings when noting that
his office was under 'attack' by crime-controlled media outlets. Even with the
shinkage in his personnel, he noted that financial crime-related arrests are being
made and include: Mikhail Mirilachvili arrested in St. Petersburg; Serguei "Ossia"
Boutorine and his sidekick, Marat Polianski, of the Orekhovskaya group, were
arrested in Spain.
The "Kommersant Daily" speculated that Russian prosecutors may be prepared to
reopen the Mabatex fraud and corruption case in exchange for an agreement by
the Swiss to drop demands for the extradition of former Kremlin aide Pavel
Borodin. Borodin was recently arrested in the United States on Swiss money-laundering
charges. Proof that Borodin is super-important to some in the Russian upper-circle
is the finding that Belarus President, Alexander Lukashenko, offered to exchange a
yet-to-be identified Western "spy" for their man in the US slammer.
Western intelligence ponders two questions: Who is the exchange spy Lukashenko has
in mind and what is it that Borodin knows that could damage someone in Belarus.
If a recruitment attempt fails, and it is reported, serious consequences may result for the
intelligence service. The intelligence officer(s) involved may be declared persona non grata
(PNG) and expelled from the country; if he does not have diplomatic status, he could face
trial and imprisonment. If the target agrees to the recruitment, that person becomes an
"asset" or "agent"-pointedly, he has become a spy. The intelligence officer, also called
the "case officer," handles the asset in which he clandestinely receives the intelligence,
pays his agent, and guides the asset in his illicit activities. Reasons for betraying one's
country are complex, but money is almost always involved. Blackmail, incidentally, is rarely
used. Pursuit of financial gain, however, often represents some other personal or
psychological need such as ego enhancement, revenge, etc.
Despite the number of Americans who have initiated their own espionage careers and have
volunteered, foreign intelligence services, nevertheless, continue to invest considerable
time and resources in assessing and targeting U.S. citizens for recruitment approaches.
Furthermore, recruitment approaches are almost never made out-of-the-blue, but are actually
the end result of detailed planning and thorough assessment of the target. By the time a
target is asked to work for an intelligence service, the individual is probably aware
that a dubious relationship is developing.
This web page is intended to help sensitize you to targeting by intelligence services,
assist you in recognizing and countering recruitment attempts, and advise you to immediately
report an incident or questionable relationship. Your contribution to the collective
security of your agency and the nation is vital.
From Dr. Benjamin Church, America's first Surgeon General who spied for the British in
1775 on General Washington's command, to former CIA officer Aldrich Ames, those Americans
who have spied have betrayed a special trust to the Country, to their friends and colleagues,
and to their families. Regardless of their personal rationales for their treason, all
had other, appropriate means of fulfilling their aspirations, needs, and desires. Most,
if not all, spies come to regret their acts and their fateful decisions to commit espionage.
At the crossroads, they chose the selfish path.
No matter what the circumstances, no matter what the motivations, working illicitly for a
foreign intelligence service is indefensible and is never the right decision. The reality
of espionage is deceit, betrayal, manipulation, and ultimately destruction.
You can, however, be vigilant and monitor the progress of associations, particularly new
relationships and those with foreign nationals. Always be particularly heedful of discussions,
however seemingly benign, regarding your work. Most acquaintances will of course have some
degree of interest in your employment, but should be willing to respect your boundaries once
you have established them. Persistent inquiries regarding your employment should raise some
concern in your mind and be discussed with the appropriate authorities.
If you are ever pitched, clearly and unmistakably turn down any request to enter into a
clandestine or illicit relationship. Immediately report the incident (please see Reporting).
To reiterate, you must immediately report any discussion in which someone asks you
to provide sensitive information which they are not authorized to receive. If in doubt,
your Security Office has or knows personnel that are available to assess your
information and determine if a potential counterintelligence threat exists.
The British press announced in October that Prime Minister Tony
Blair would appoint an independent investigator to examine allegations of abuses or
wrongdoing by Britain's intelligence and security services.
Also in October, the press stated that disgraced Tory minister,
Jonathan Aitken, was one of three alleged agents named in a formal complaint to be
laid against the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6) and the Security Service
(SS or MI5).
Aitken and his accomplices were described as the "evil core" of a
"corrupt club" which dominated and tainted the two services in recent years. This
remark was credited to Gerald James, former chairman of Astra plc, the company at the
heart of the arms-for-Iraq affair.
MI6 director, David Spedding, and the chief of Britain's military
intelligence service will be questioned behind closed doors by the House of Commons'
foreign affairs select committee about new allegations of MI6 involvement with "private
soldiers" in Sierra Leone. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) was also in for some
bad press after the announcement of a full security review following the charging of
senior CPS administrative officer, Mark Herbert, for leaking a list of 33 police informers
to organized crime.
Amid the talk of government intelligence failures of late, there is evidence
of an intelligence failure of another sort - a very special kind - and in the
White House, itself. There has been a counterintelligence failure in the
executive mansion. The United States Secret Service (USSS) does not have a
counterintelligence function, thus the White House Secret Service detail,
dedicated to protecting the first family, principally the president, from
physical threats, is not set up to deal with hostile foreign intelligence
operations. The Secret Service White House detail, without a clear mandate
and without the necessary CI training and experience, is not up to the job.
It is unable to protect the president from foreign intelligence collection and
covert action, or influence, operations. This operational lapse, or "CI gap," if
you will, apparently has contributed to the counterintelligence misfortunes, to
put a kindly word to them, that now beset the Clinton administration, particularly
the White House.
According to The Washington Post of May 22, 1997, Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), a
member of the Senate Judiciary Committee and a former prosecutor himself,
revealed that "Attorney General Janet Reno testified before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, that the FBI had withheld national security information from the
president because he is a potential subject in a pending investigation. That
revelation has critical implications for our constitutional government...",
the senator said. The president cannot carry out his duties properly as, required
by law, without full briefings. The details of this constitutional crisis never
emerged publicly and the media made no apparent effort to press for them, sex
scandals apparently having a higher priority. The president was in trouble a year
ago and the Secret Service should have known about it from the papers but what
could it do?
In any case, that was a year ago and much has happened since. For example,
according to press reports, Johnny Chung, a fund-raiser for the Democratic
Party, has told U.S. investigators that he was given $300,000 by a Chinese
Communist Army officer (who was also a high official of a satellite and missile
production unit in China, and incidentally the daughter of the then-top army
general and one of the highest officials of the Chinese Communist Party). The
money was for Democratic Party political campaigns in the U.S. in 1996. Another
serious counterintelligence problem for the White House. Still another White
House counterintelligence problem, possibly related, was highlighted by the
Justice Department by its move to investigate the administration's decision
to export critical satellite technology to China. This effort by Justice seeks
to determine whether the administration's unfortunate decision was influenced
by the head of one of the two American firms that benefitted, a major donor
to the Democratic Party.
Counterintelligence officials realize that intelligence collection and
covert action, or influence, operations often go hand in hand. People on
whom foreign intelligence personnel work may be totally innocent of wrongdoing.
On the other hand, they may be willing assets of the foreign intelligence
service that importunes them. A counterintelligence sense in the White House
could possibly have warned of the methods of operation of foreign operatives
and the risks to American personnel.
The former finance director of the DNC told the Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee last year that he "had a sense that [Chung] was taking money from
[Chinese businessmen] and then giving it to us." This observation is not bad
for a political money man and would have been useful if factored into a
counterintelligence assessment early on.
Members of the Secret Service would sacrifice their lives to save the
president's. They have died in the line of duty elsewhere. But they are not
up to the job of counterintelligence in the White House. Then, what are the
counterintelligence credentials of the so-called chief of "Oval Office operations"
who has testified before a grand jury in the "White House sex and obstruction
of justice" case? What role do NSC staffers, if any is trained in CI, play in
White House matters? What ever happened to the two FBI special agents assigned
to White House duty to help in employee background checks and were removed in a
dispute over poor White House security practices? Did they have a CI function,
at all? Who, if anyone, from the FBI replaced them? The FBI after all has the
internal counterintelligence function for the federal government.
The upshot is that there is little or no counterintelligence protection in the
presidential mansion. Obviously, it is desperately needed. The Secret Service
detail can protect the president from vehicle bombs by closing off Pennsylvania
Avenue - "America's Main Street" - in front of the White House, but it cannot
protect him from the so-called "China Plan" waged from Peking. It is not
supposed to, of course. More important: it cannot protect America from the
Chinese Communist intelligence onslaught if the president himself persists in
remaining blind to it.
The temptation is to read JAPAN'S SECRET WAR as proof the United States was correct in
leveling two Japanese cities in the Summer of 1945.
Robert Wilcox didn't find documentation anvwhere that President Truman ever knew the
Emperor's military might was concocking its own bombs and that they had specific plans
for their use. Truth is, Truman's intelligence apparatus pertaining to the Far East
was low grade and he is likely to have suspected but never actually possessed confimmed
facts one way or the other.
Wilcox wrote: "...the United States may have [been] known about the Japanese project
before the end of the war, and this infommation might have influenced President Harry
Truman's decision to use the bomb on Japan."(l)
Wilcox uncovered the recently declassified intelligence files called, MAGIC, during his
deep and lengthy research. MAGIC, he realized, was proof the United States had broken
Japan's super-secret codes early in the war and had managed to keep the code breaking a
secret to all but a few well past war's end.
The British had ULTRA Secret with which they listened in on Gemmany's messages, Wilcox
found. Between ULTRA and MAGIC, the Allies had advanced knowledge of most of the major
war plans of Italy, Gemmany and Japan.
Little was reported in these messages, however, about Japan's probes for Uranium or its
building of special equipment for atomic bomb development. Occasionally, Wilcox stumbled
on something small perhaps to the unskilled researcher, unimportant. Wilcox wrote he
occasionally came across snipits of news clips and diplomatic writings referencing bomb
building each making him feel close to discovery. One instance was the following item:
"A German communication quotes an article in a Japanese newspaper to the effect that a
cyclotron equal in size to the one in the United States, which is the world's largest,...
will be completed in the shops of Ishikawajima Dockyards by the end of the year."(2)
What appears on first reading to be a large amount of raw data available through MAGIC
and ULTRA, especially MAGIC, may have suffered from what law enforcement would recognize
as data "...kept close to the vest." Information kept too secret, police intelligence
will suggest, is data NOT shared. Secret findings are sometimes not written anyplace
and carried in people's heads to briefings. Word of this building of the cyclotron and
the subsequent construction of uranium digging and testing at the facility in North Korea
may have been known by a limited few. Perhaps the President didn't need or want such
detail since closure of the war was assured with his swift approval for bomb delivery.
Wilcox noted the Japanese nuclear specialists rid themselves of their records, too, or
didm't keep any, thus there was little left by them for reference purposes.(3)
There may have been fear the Russians would hear of such things if they communicated too
much and would beat the United States to the Konan-Hunonam plant and to other Japanese
nuclear-related sites in Manchuria. Being naive in their handling and use of
international intelligence, the United States likely assumed the Russians knew nothing
of their own atomic progress or the work of the Japanese and they would reach Konan first.
According to Robert Wilcox, the Russians knew nearly everything through American spies
and their own observations. At war's end, they beat the Americans to the Japanese plants
and equipment in Manchuria and at Konan, North Korea.
Assume the target knows more than you think and strive for tighter security without
curtailment of sharing
Source: Wilcox, Robert K. JAPAN'S SECRET WAR, Japan's Race Against Time To Build
It's Own Atomic Bomb, Marlowe & Company, NY, (1995)
Counterintelligence and the Intelligence Process
Gaetano Joe Ilardi
“Invincibility depends on one’s self;
vulnerability on him” - - Sun Tzu (1)
Collection, evaluation, collation, analysis and dissemination! These
are the stages that spring to mind when one thinks of intelligence and
the intelligence process. They are well known to anyone familiar with
intelligence and the role performed by intelligence officers the world
over. But how many of these same people are familiar with counterintelligence
and its relationship with intelligence as we have all come to know it?
As intelligence officers, how can counterintelligence be of assistance to
us? Conversely, how can our failure to adequately consider counterintelligence
as a contributor to intelligence restrict or hinder our performance? It
will be the aim of this paper to address these questions and suggest that
greater consideration be given to counterintelligence as a strategy designed
not only for security purposes, but also to stand on its own as a valuable
contributor to intelligence! They must not be viewed as separate entities
whose paths rarely if ever cross, but rather as two disciplines whose very
existence depends on one another.
The views expressed within this paper are those of the author and
not necessarily those of the Victoria Police or The Palmer Press.
Often, when I speak to people within law enforcement circles about counterintelligence,
the first thing that happens is that I am on the receiving end of a strange look.
“What do you mean?” they often ask. After some deliberation, many surprisingly reply
that counterintelligence represents an attempt by criminals to thwart law enforcement
efforts to gather intelligence on them. “That’s right” I say, “but it also represents
an attempt on our part to ensure that we frustrate criminal attempts to gather
intelligence on us!” This is a surprising response because many people are more
inclined to associate counterintelligence practices with criminals (or those on the
wrong side of the law) rather than with law enforcement (or those on the right side
of the law). This is perhaps a sad indictment on the current state of counterintelligence
within law enforcement and possibly elsewhere. If, however, this is representative
of the current state of knowledge about counterintelligence within areas where it
should at least be in the back of everyone’s mind, one wonders how much thought has
actually been given to the more complex question of how counterintelligence can contribute
to the intelligence process itself?
Counterintelligence - an intelligence function
makes considerable sense when one remembers that intelligence is merely a process
(as distinct from the end product which is also referred to as intelligence) that
seeks to produce a better grade of information. Whilst the information on which
the intelligence process feeds may frequently be sensitive and secret, there is
nothing mystical about the process itself. The intelligence process can therefore
be applied to any area where there is a need to produce what is frequently termed
value-added information.(3) Employing intelligence methods and processes
is therefore a vital component in any counterintelligence strategy for the purposes
of threat identification and vulnerability assessment.(4)
Essentially, counterintelligence is about protecting information and/or intelligence
from those hostile to you or your organisation.(5) Broadly speaking, this
can be achieved in one of two ways. Counterintelligence can be employed either
passively or aggressively. When employed passively, it fulfills the traditional
security function of protecting information, installations and personnel.(6)
In other words, its philosophy is “let’s wait ‘til the enemy comes to us”.
When employed aggressively, it actively seeks out those suspected of planning or
attempting to launch an hostile intelligence probe. In other words, active or
aggressive counterintelligence represents an intelligence gathering exercise with
a specific counterintelligence emphasis or objective to determine what the enemy is
planning against you! The methods employed in this process are not all together
unlike the methods employed during traditional intelligence collection, and include
the use of informers, surveillance, electronic interception and the execution of
The problems for counterintelligence
Frequently used interchangeably with counterespionage, counterintelligence was once
described as “a Dantean hell with ninety-nine circles”.(7) Others have explained that
counterintelligence “depends on cunning entrapments, agents provocateurs, spies and
counterspies, double and triple crosses. It is the stuff that spy novels are made of,
with limitless possibilities for deception and turns of plot.”(8) All of this intrigue,
mystery and crosses and double-crosses have earned counterintelligence an unenviable
reputation within the intelligence community, often being labeled excessively secretive
and paranoid. Indeed, in an organisation such as the CIA, where suspicion and mistrust
are part and parcel of daily life, those involved in counterintelligence are thought
of as the “professional paranoids”. In fact, within the CIA it was once believed that
the counterintelligence staff operated on the assumption that the organisation had
been penetrated by the KGB.(9) (After the relatively recent Aldrich Ames case, it would
not be surprising if this was still the case).(10) The perception that the history
of counterintelligence has been one characterised by an excessive reliance upon paranoia,
traditional spycraft and secrecy have all tended to denigrate the importance and value
of this most interesting and valuable of disciplines. This perhaps explains why counterintelligence is a rarely thought of discipline within many intelligence sites,(11)
and why it has been under-utilised as a contributor to intelligence generally. (If you
think this is an exaggeration, I ask how many of you out there involved in intelligence and belonging to an intelligence area have a counterintelligence doctrine in place or have even given the issue more than a moments thought).
Whilst this may go a certain way in explaining the general absence of counterintelligence, other reasons are also surely to blame, in particular the perception held among some that it is simply not necessary. It is uncertain as to why this view prevails in so many cases, although several suggestions can be made:-
- to admit the need for a counterintelligence strategy is to concede that current security measures are, and have been, inadequate;
- it forces one to admit that there is the possibility that there are those within the organisation who cannot be trusted and who might be prepared to sell out to the enemy; and
Whilst I do not propose to deal with the first two points (since they represent issues relating to internal politics), the third can be, and should be addressed. If any organisation believes that it does not require counterintelligence, it must be able to answer both of the following questions in the negative. If on the other hand these questions are answered in the affirmative, then the need for a counterintelligence strategy becomes necessary.
- the type of threats that would be met by a counterintelligence strategy do not, and cannot, exist here.
- information exists which one wishes to protect or keep secret; and
In today’s day and age, one would be hard pressed to find any organisation in which information was not the key to maintaining a competitive edge over one’s opposition. This therefore would make it very difficult for many organisations out there to answer both these questions in the negative. It is not being insinuated that all organisations engage in espionage against their competitors or are the victims of industrial espionage themselves. But it must be remembered that information can be obtained by illegal and unethical means (often in the form of closed source information) as well as by completely legal and ethical means (frequently open source information). All organisations must constantly be on guard to ensure that they adequately protect themselves from those who might use either or both of these methods to gain that all-important edge.
- individuals or organisations exist which are actively engaged in efforts to obtain this information by clandestine or unclandestine means. These efforts can be legal or illegal, ethical or unethical.
Law enforcement agencies, government departments and private enterprises throughout the world have all been the victims (although not always to their knowledge) of hostile intelligence probes, since all are repositories for information which someone else outside the organisation also considers to be of value. Whilst private industry has accepted for many decades now that industrial espionage represents a serious threat to their competitiveness (and have in many instances put mechanisms in place to reduce the threat), areas such as law enforcement are proving much slower to respond. (Experience tends to indicate that police forces are content to allow their internal investigations or ethical standard units to perform the counterintelligence function. This, however, well and truly falls short of the mark, since it makes the assumption that threats to information/intelligence can only come from within).
Recent history is replete with examples of how well-organised groups have penetrated law enforcement agencies with the specific aim of gathering intelligence relating to themselves, their opponents, specific police members and police modus operandi. Many ingenious methods have been used. These methods demonstrate an ingenious utilisation of open and closed sources to learn everything they possibly can to ensure the survival and growth of their organisations. Within the US for example, it has been alleged that the conservative, quasi-religious group known as Aryan Nation watch television programs such as COPS and other so-called real life police shows, in order to identify officers, learn about police tactics and gain an overall appreciation of how law enforcement conduct their business.(12) Similarly, motorcycle gangs have made videos of police employees entering and leaving police buildings and have even encouraged young supporters to join police forces so that they can then be used to feed information back to the organisation. These prospective employees have no criminal or intelligence histories (indeed they are chosen by the criminal organisation for this very reason), so that it makes it very difficult for law enforcement to detect them at the screening stage. There are also examples of criminal groups who have deliberately made low bids on commercial cleaning contracts as a means of gaining ‘legitimate’ access to police buildings.(13) Whilst this underbidding may result in considerable financial cost to the criminal organisation, it is this type of aggressive intelligence collection which allows these organisations to survive and prosper. One might even call it clever return on investment.
If these are the measures which organisations such as motor cycle gangs are prepared to go in their quest for intelligence, one would imagine that groups such as terrorists, who are frequently more motivated, better resourced and often show a remarkable commitment to their cause, are even more proficient in their intelligence collection efforts. Indeed, a quick analysis of many terrorist incidents will reveal that they could only have been carried out with the assistance of intelligence. It is extremely naïve, for example, to believe terrorists get out of bed one morning deciding to carry out some act without thorough planning. Integral to any such organising effort is intelligence. In many terrorist organisations throughout the world, it is not uncommon to find intelligence cells, whose sole function it is to provide intelligence support to the operational arm of the organisation. In Northern Ireland, for example, legislators have come to realise the importance of intelligence to terrorist groups (both republican and loyalist), enacting legislation which makes it an offence to possess documents which are likely to be of use to terrorists.(14)
What can counterintelligence offer?
Effective intelligence is heavily dependent upon effective counterintelligence! Whilst I hear many doubting voices out there pose the question “How?” a moments thought will quickly demonstrate the validity of this statement. Let’s commence with the most obvious - the importance of secrecy. Counterintelligence, whether employed passively or aggressively, must set for itself the most basic of objectives, and that is to ensure that information/intelligence is protected from those not authorised to receive it. Indeed, the establishment of a counterintelligence unit will be able to assist in delivering this service in some of the following ways:-
- by conducting risk analysis on projects considered vulnerable from an information security perspective, looking at employees, possible opponents related to the project and site security;
- by serving as a repository of information pertinent to counterintelligence, including methods believed to be employed by those seeking to penetrate the organisation based on local, interstate and international experience and incidents;
- by preparing and delivering education/awareness programs directed at all areas and levels within the organisation;
- by conducting random on-site inspections to ensure that areas within the organisation are adhering to counterintelligence principles and procedures; and
But how can this alone make any significant contribution to intelligence itself? The protection of intelligence is vital because the effectiveness and value of that intelligence as a means of determining one’s opponent’s intentions and method of operations will be compromised should it fall into the wrong hands. The reason is that if your enemy knows what information you have on them this will allow them the opportunity to alter strategies. It will frequently require them to reconsider how they conduct their business so as to deprive their opponents of the advantage that such information brings them. A simple example at this point will help clarify the point. Let’s say that a certain police force is continuously in the process of developing intelligence on a certain motorcycle gang. This intelligence might indicate that this gang are in the habit of manufacturing drugs by purchasing chemicals from a certain source and by employing a particular method of purchase. If it suddenly became know to this motorcycle gang that the police where aware of these facts, then it can safely be assumed that they will change their methods. In other words, this will render much of the intelligence held by that police force as its relates to that gang’s manufacture of drugs next to useless.
The moral of the story is therefore this - your failure to adequately protect your intelligence will inevitably undermine the usefulness of this intelligence and ultimately only serve to benefit one’s opponents. But it must be remembered that much of what takes place in the realm of counterintelligence is reciprocal. Just as our enemies can take advantage of our counterintelligence failures, then so can we take advantage of theirs. Indeed, every time intelligence is collected on your opponent, it represents a counterintelligence failure on their part (assuming they employ counterintelligence in the first place).
- by circulating threat information alerting personnel of anticipated threats (and methods) to information.
Using law enforcement as an example, weak counterintelligence can also affect the quality of intelligence in the following way. Weak law enforcement counterintelligence will enhance the intelligence collection capabilities of criminal elements seeking to penetrate law enforcement organisations. Armed with this new information, such as police methods of operation, intentions, the identity of informers and undercover operatives, etc, the counterintelligence capabilities of the criminal organisation is thereby enhanced. This situation in turn reduces law enforcement’s intelligence collection capabilities, since the criminal organisation is now better equipped, in both a physical and mental sense, to deal with any efforts by police to gather information. This will further erode law enforcement’s counterintelligence capabilities because law enforcement will have even less idea of what the criminal organisation is up to (since it must be remembered that counterintelligence is an intelligence function, and it, like any other area of intelligence finds its life-blood in the form of information). A vicious cycle is thereby created where poor counterintelligence undermines the overall amount and quality of intelligence and further erodes whatever counterintelligence strategy may be in place. In other words, strong counterintelligence inevitably feeds off the weaker counterintelligence of its opponent. In the truest possible sense, it is survival of the fittest, most cunning, resourceful and committed.
Similarly, the employment of a successful counterintelligence strategy can provide vital information regarding the activities of one’s enemies and affords the opportunity to feed this information back into the intelligence cycle. For example, information regarding an opponent’s hostile intelligence probe will reveal significant information, such as their information voids, capabilities and intentions.(15) To this extent, counterintelligence can be seen to be a significant producer of intelligence outside its specific area of responsibility.
It is unfortunate that there are some people out there who have failed to appreciate the importance of counterintelligence and its potential role within law enforcement or whatever other area one might care to think of. It seems that in this time of political correctness, these people are more concerned about the term “counterintelligence” and its connotations of paranoia and aggressiveness than they are about what it can deliver. Whilst many continue to procrastinate and refuse to accept that countries like Australia cannot and do not harbor the types of criminals that could be organised and motivated enough to conduct intelligence gathering probes against law enforcement, I say “think again!” Not only logic, but history, especially recent history, has proven these people wrong. To me, this attitude epitomises an arrogance and sheltered perception of a criminal element which is becoming increasingly well-resourced, daring, sophisticated and sometimes has a better appreciation of intelligence than do those on the right side of the law. In the end, we must constantly bear in mind that what we can do to them, they can do to us! The commonly held misconception among organisations such as those involved in law enforcement that they are the pursuers and not the pursued is the first and most important obstacle in the way of developing a counterintelligence doctrine. With this in mind, it is appropriate to conclude with a Sulc analogy, which whilst law enforcement specific in this case, can be applied across the board - “In the “eternal cat-and-mouse game” involved in the business of cops and robbers, law enforcement needs to be the “cat” as much as possible.”(16)
- - - - - - -
Bottom, N. and Gallati, R. 1984. Industrial Espionage: Intelligence Techniques and Countermeasures, USA, Butterworth.
Mangold, T. 1992. Cold Warrior. James Jesus Angleton: The CIA’s Master Spy Hunter, USA, Simon and Schuster.
Marchetti, V. and Marks, J.D. 1974. The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, New York, Dell Publishing.
Prunckun, H.W. 1989. Information Security. A practical handbook on business counterintelligence, Illinois, Charles C. Thomas.
Sulc, L.B. 1996. Law Enforcement Counterintelligence, USA, Varro Press.
Taylor, M. and Quayle, E. 1994. Terrorist Lives, London, Brassey’s.
Tzu, S. 1971. The Art of War, USA, Oxford University Press.
- - - - - - -
(1) Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Oxford University Press, USA, 1971, p.85.
(2) Lawrence B Sulc. Law Enforcement Counterintelligence. Varro Press, USA, 1996, p..xvii.
(3) Ibid. p.xv.
(4) See Norman Bottom and Robert Gallati's, Industrial Espionage: Intelligence Techniques and Countermeasures. Butterworth, USA, 1984. This book provides a valuable insight into the relationship between intelligence and counterintelligence from an industrial espionage perspective.
(5) Whilst counterintelligence is specifically concerned with the actual protection of information/intelligence, its general goal is also that of preventing anything which has the potential to undermine the quality of intelligence. The use of disinformation is one technique used in order to undermine the quality of intelligence generated by an opponent. It is therefore also the role of counterintelligence to prevent this from happening.
(6) William L. Cassidy. Studies in Counterintelligence. 1991, p.2.
(7) Cited in Tom Mangold. Cold Warrior. James Jesus Angleton: The CIA's Master Spy Hunter. Simon and Schuster, USA, 1992, p.40.
(8) Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. Dell Publishing, New York, 1974, p.206.
(9) Ibid. p.208.
(10) Aldrich Ames was an employee of the CIA for 31 years before being arrested and revealed by the FBI in 1994 on charges of committing espionage on behalf of Russia and the former Soviet Union. Ames' espionage activities commenced in early 1985 whilst working in the Directorate of Operations, and it is believed that his activities caused the death or imprisonment of a number of Soviets who had been sources of the CIA and FBI. (See the US Department of Defense Security Awareness Bulletin 4-94 for an excellent summary of these events). The events surrounding the Ames case were so embarrassing for the CIA, and the US generally, that a Presidential Directive was issued resulting in the establishment of the National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC).
(11) Intelligence agencies whose area of responsibility can be described as that of "national security", traditionally have shown a greater appreciation of the need for counterintelligence than say areas such as law enforcement. The reasons for this are difficult to fathom, although a better understanding of intelligence and a tendency not to undermine the abilities and determination of their opponents (since most are in fact other countries), perhaps goes a long way in explaining this divide.
(12) Sulc, Op. cit. p.40.
(13) Ibid. p.136.
(14) Maxwell Taylor and Ethel Quayle. Terrorist Lives. Brassey's, London, 1994, p.81.
(15) Henry W. Prunckun, Information Security. A practical handbook on business counterintelligence. Charles C. Thomas, Illinois, 1989, p.9.
(16) Sulc, Op. cit. p.ix.
Senior Constable Gaetano Joe Ilardi is an intelligence officer with Victoria Police's
(Australia) Crime Intelligence Support Centre. He has been involved with policing in
various areas for the past nine years. He has a Bachelor of Arts (Hons) and a Master of
Arts (Politics) and is currently conducting preliminary research for a Ph.D. focusing on
the role of intelligence within terrorist organisations. His primary interests are in the
areas of counterterrorism and counterintelligence. The author would also like to thank his
good friend and work colleague, Tom Burns, who served as a valuable sounding-board for many
of the ideas that appear in this article.
Law Enforcement Counterintelligence
Lawrence B. Sulc
A specialist in corporate intelligence I know once wrote of the time he was briefing a
businessman client on competitive intelligence - how to establish a business
intelligence (BI) function in his company and how to go about collecting, collating
and analyzing information about the market and about his competitors. Such functions
per se are completely lawful and ethical. Such business intelligence (often
called competitive intelligence) as a profession has grown greatly in the United States
over the past decade. In fact, U.S. business is playing catch up ball in the field -
Japanese and French business, for example, are way ahead.
In any case, the BI briefer said, at a certain point "the light went on." His businessman
client exclaimed, "If I'm doing that to them, aren't they doing that to
me?" Yes indeed, they most probably are - and to lots and lots of other folks, as
well. In most cases the collection is completely legal - but the process can be misused.
In other cases - legal or otherwise - the competition are at it and the results are often
not good for the performance of the targeted firm. It behooves every business person to
be aware that, whether or not he/she is prepared to engage in the process, others are
prepared and do engage in it, gaining significant advantage thereby. Sometimes the loss
is slight and sometimes disastrous.
In view of all this, why would any serious police officer believe that if he is doing
something interesting and worthwhile, someone who shouldn't be interested in what he/she
is doing is interested? And that somebody might be very suspect from the law
enforcement point of view. A number of old pros in police work have told me, "Cops don't
have a clue." These are not my words, but theirs. "Cops are used to following people,"
one veteran officer with local, county and state experience, told me. "They aren't used
to being followed themselves." The police desperately need counterintelligence and most
of them don't realize it.
To illustrate, some time ago, I was talking to a Congressional investigator about law
enforcement counterintelligence. He had spent some time, he said, talking with the pilot
of a small drug smuggling plane who had "defected." The pilot had flown marijuana from
Mexico into the U.S., and was now cooperating with the authorities. His information was
so good, the Feds were sharing him with Congressional investigators. Small planes are
unable to fly very far without refueling, the investigator pointed out. "How could you
fly all the way from Mexico to the Chicago area?" By refueling at several stops along the
way, the witness explained, small out-of-the-way landing strips. The investigator asked
how the smugglers knew where it was safe to drop down out of the sky carrying a load of
pot. There was good intelligence, the pilot explained; the smugglers knew which sheriff's
deputies were cooperative. Local biker gangs provided them with the necessary details.
How did they know? Certain gang members had girl friends who worked in sheriffs'
offices in a number of key counties along the way. The biker gangs kept the dope
smugglers informed. The girl friends kept them informed.
The smugglers had good intelligence; the authorities, in the other hand, had poor
counterintelligence. The lesson is obvious. Anyone involved in anything worthwhile
is likely to become an object of interest to someone else whose motives are not the
best. It behooves him/her to keep the unduly curious at arm's length. Gaetano Joe Ilardi,
senior constable and intelligence officer with the Crime Intelligence Support Centre,
Victoria (Australia) Police, understands and, fortunately, is writing about it. "Law
enforcement agencies, government departments and private enterprises throughout the world
have all been the victims (although not always to their knowledge) of hostile intelligence
probes...", Ilardi says. "...(N)ot always to their knowledge." That's the problem.
Intelligence/counterintelligence is an area where you can be taken to the cleaners without
knowing you've left home, or without even suspecting it. (I wonder, are people "taken
to the cleaners" in Australia?)
"Experience tends to indicate that police forces are content to allow their internal
investigations or ethical standards units to perform the counterintelligence functions."
Ilardi says. "This, however, well and truly falls short of the mark, since it makes the
assumption that threats to information/intelligence can only come from within." He is
right, of course. Police departments would do well to organize formal intelligence
divisions, supported by competent counterintelligence units. There are numerous vicious
criminal groups out there who are able to do significant harm to law enforcement. The
latter needs CI to protect themselves and to go after the 'bad guys.'
Ilardi outlines the key points in establishing a CI capability in the police. He cites
"risk analysis," key because it is essential to understand what is important and what
must truly be protected. Not everything needs to be - or can be. The CI unit provides a
repository of information about the methods of operation (MO) of target groups. He also
mentions that it is essential to have an education/awareness program to create an
understanding of CI throughout the service. Everyone involved must understand the need
for a CI activity. A "counterintelligence" must be established, as others explain it.
Ilardi proposes "random on-site inspections," and, finally, calls for the circulation of
threat information to alert everyone involved to key CI issues.
Ilardi makes a very interesting point: Every time intelligence is collected on your
opponent, he says, it represents a counterintelligence failure on his part. It is not
difficult to understand which side should be doing the collecting on the other and who
should be having the CI failures. To make that point clear, he quotes this author as
saying, in the eternal cat-and-mouse game - the business of cops and robbers - law
enforcement needs to be the cat as much as possible. Ilardi makes it clear he knows what
he is talking about when he refers to the other side as "our enemy," for indeed they are
and they can be very nasty sometimes.
Lawrence Sulc served for more than 23 years as an operations officer
for the CIA, mostly overseas. His experience included intelligence collection, special operations and counterintelligence.
He has an AB degree from Stanford University. After his time with the CIA, Sulc served for seven years as an investigator and staff member for the U.S. House of Representatives. He left government service as deputy assistant secretary for interdepartmental affairs in the Department of State (Bureau of Intelligence and Research). Today he is a private consultant - risk assessment, corporate intelligence, counterintelligence and counterterrorism.
He is founder and president of the Nathan Hale Institute, an organization dedicated to strengthening U.S. intelligence capability. Sulc has extensive first-hand knowledge of the lengths to which adversaries will go to gain tactical and strategic advantage.
His book, Law Enforcement Counterintelligence, can be obtained several ways. Through his EMAIL, by telephone at 202-546-2293, or directly from Varro Press, PO Box 8413, Shawnee Mission, KS 66208, and by telephone at 913-385-2034.
Counterintelligence Considerations for Law Enforcement
This paper(1) discusses a few of the techniques and procedures required to
aggressively identify, neutralize, and exploit the attempts by criminal groups or
persons to corrupt or penetrate the official activities of the law enforcement agency.
It takes the position that counterintelligence is meant to support the overall
agency mission by providing management with a clear picture of threats, real or believed,
and to suggest actions to take to protect the agency from exploitation by criminal
individuals or groups.
Counterintelligence operations include the conducting of surveillance, offensive and
defensive source operations, security and vulnerability analyses, as well as providing
support to basic intelligence collection.
The need for a counterintelligence function for law enforcement is not as yet well
accepted by many law enforcement chief executives. Many still struggle to determine
the utility of counterintelligence's parent function, criminal intelligence, and few
have had time or interest to devote to a study of the latter.(2)
In 1998, the main contributions to departmental security, when they do exist, have
been for the most part the positioning of human door guards, restricting facility
parking, mounting window screens and, for a limited few agencies, metal detectors
at entrance ways. Inside most departments, their evidence lockers, intelligence files,
and weapons closets are all under lock and key. When summed up, it appears that
current agency security can be easily classified as crisis solving, somewhat cosmetic,
and sufficient only to deter those criminals who are short of resolve and lack
Certainly, all chief executive officers harbor great concern concerning the possibility
of attacks against their law enforcement agencies and personnel. This is evidenced
by the steps they have taken in such responses as the control over facility parking and
pedestrian access and egress to buildings. All are well aware of the many incidents in
which law enforcement facilities have been under siege and where unaware police personnel
have been caught in ambush. But there are other investments in security to be made, as
well, such as having a level-of-effort trouble shooter on staff whose skills provide the
department with a cost effective consulting resource regarding security of a more
sophisticated nature. And these suggested security improvements do not amount to much
in cash outlay for they are devoted more to threat assessing, staff vetting, department
awareness training, and in using criminal sources to greater advantage, than to the
purchase of special equipment and the like.
Counterintelligence (CI), although always small in personnel number, should be an
integral and important part of the agency criminal intelligence function (CINT). The
basic functions of CINT and CI are defined below.
- (CINT) Situation development: To produce, but not be limited
to, strategic assessments, threat reports, oral briefings.
- (CINT) Target development: Target development on accessible suspect individuals-groups and to develop material in support of investigations and prosecutions.
As an important component of criminal intelligence, CI supports the total intelligence
process through its ongoing focus on possible criminal efforts conducted by suspect
individuals-groups, which, if successful, could undermine the capabilities and intent
of the department. CI provides administration a view of a suspect individual's or group's
intelligence collection and targeting situation.
- (CI) Counterintelligence: To provide operational security and to detect/exploit suspect individuals-groups who would negate or alter the official activities of the department.
By its very nature, a CI should be a multidiscipline effort designed to counter a suspect
individual's-group's collection attempts. To express its many disciplines, this paper
will use the term: multidiscipline counterintelligence (MDCI). MDCI is a concerted effort
to demonstrate that the CI work force, in conjunction with the other intelligence assets,
must have the capability to detect all aspects of intelligence collection and related
activities that pose a threat to the security, operations, personnel, and resources of
the agency. Through its data base the MDCI provides useful recommendations for the denial
of information to suspect individuals-groups.
It should be noted that the administrative decision to use or not use CI generated
recommendations for action each aimed at denying collection opportunities to suspect
individual-groups is solely a management prerogative. Management, upon being warned
of the possible attack or penetration by its CI, may choose to ignore the CI warning in
favor of time, resources, or other higher priority tasks. The timely warning, however,
suffices as a successful CI end product regardless of the action taken by administration.
Mission and Structure
Throughout the one hundred years of criminal intelligence use by law enforcement,
counterintelligence has played little more than a diminutive role. Seldom has it
provided anything useful for agency management that could be described (from the military
point of view, at least,) as true CI end products. During the evolution of law enforcement
criminal intelligence, CI has remained in the background at the sometimes costly expense
of law enforcement agencies.
The primary six areas of interest of CI operations (taken directly from the military
model) for law enforcement agencies are described below.
- Detect - CI seeks out evidence that suspect individuals-groups
are planning criminal acts against the department and/or any of its many responsibilities.
- Identify - CI seeks to identify suspect individuals-groups whose intent it is to interrupt agency operations through unlawful means.
- Assess - CI collects raw data on suspect individuals-groups and assesses their potential for impacting department operations.
- Exploit - CI studies the real or possible weaknesses of suspect individuals-groups and develops lawful means for using these weaknesses to department advantage.
- Neutralize - CI studies the quality of security of the department and takes steps to upgrade procedures and the physical setting where necessary.
Counterintelligence should be an integral part of both law enforcement in general and
intelligence in specific. Its role to carry out projects in support of the objectives
of both. CI must operate under the same rules, regulations, and laws as those governing
its parent function, criminal intelligence. Foremost among its concerns is the protection
of right to privacy for all suspect individual-groups on whom it collects raw data and
identifies in file. The CI effort must have no special privileges nor should its efforts
focus solely on politics, religion, sexual preference, or matters of race, unless any one
or all of these subject areas are shown to be, or are believed to be, crime related.
- Counter - CI develops materials for use that, when provided to suspect individuals-groups, may misdirect or misinform so as to counter their knowledge of department operations.
- As already described above, CI must be a MDCI effort since it is targeted against suspect
individuals-groups who are, themselves, MDCI and who often possess their own sophisticated
collection techniques and skills. As segments of its responsibility, CI should:
- Execute the daily CI mission.
- Convey to management an understanding of the size and impact known threats may have on the agency.
- Conduct programs to directly neutralize the criminal capabilities of suspect individuals-groups.
- Provide support to the criminal intelligence function and the agency through agency and CINT internal security such as target development and collection, staff vetting, and analysis and production.
Although a major part of the CI mission is to counter or neutralize external criminal
intelligence efforts, this does not mean that only CI personnel play a role in these
actions. The CI may require the assistance of intelligence specialists, detective
personnel, civilian counterparts, authorities, and citizens, patrol officers, as well as,
external network members.
The priorities and activities needed to support these actions will vary according to the
type of crime, level of suspect hostility, manpower limitations, crisis level (pressures
on management) and special skill requirement.
The combined effect of CI operations, techniques and counter-measures provides a MDCI
approach to denying adversaries unauthorized access to and, use of, departmental information
and plans. By using all available strengths and resources, this approach tends to pre-empt
a suspect individual-group's ability to succeed with a collection effort against the agency.
CI continues its several services much as “business as usual” regardless of the status of
crime happenings in the jurisdiction. This it does for the reason that obvious crime is
sometimes driven underground as at the conclusion of arrests and prosecutions of terrorist
groups or organized crime families. When there does exist a lull in crime, CI develops
target potential, reworks staff vetting, surveys its file holding for upgrading and purges,
and generally looks to the production of delayed or pending end products. These may
include the development of crime targets, and strategic assessments.
During the crime calm, also, CI may produce training and awareness programs to alert CINT
and agency personnel on the need for security and continued vigil over the facility and
the activities of the agency.
Several options exist regarding the CI organization. The first, it should be located at
the state level (or RISS) and made available to local agencies at their request. By making
it available from one source, local agencies will benefit by the more standard application
of CI services. Having it available from one work force, will also bring to all agencies
(small and large) the same level of skill and sophistication that otherwise would be
available only to the largest local agencies.
The second option is for the large departments to apply CI concepts on their own, thus
enjoying a certain control over their own problems and issues. In this scenario it
might be appropriate for the state or regional effort to provide the necessary CI
preparation training and then to make available these services to the smaller departments.
The CI function, as a small component of the overall criminal intelligence operation,
must have its own ability to collect, collate, analyze, and disseminate what it acquires.
As with its counterpart, CINT, it must produce a series of end products including target
proposals and alerts, conduct agency security training, do personnel vetting, and spot
check facility security. All of these services can be easily accounted for and measured
for their value to the department.
The purposes for evaluating end products is to provide direction, correct problems,
and ensure quality standards are being met.
On an informal basis, the function should be given unscheduled spot check "eye-ball"
reviews of its past end products and their results, its current use of the file, and
its future objectives. Informal inspections are spontaneous and rely heavily on the
observational powers of the reviewer.
Formal evaluations should be undertaken on a scheduled and highly documented basis
during which the current year's work is compared with past effort and the results assessed
for their value to the organization. Formal evaluations rely almost entirely on long-term
record keeping and past year's comparisons.
The operational limits, controls, and procedures for CI are but one part of the
overall criminal intelligence function guidelines. There is little reason to compose
special guidelines for CI since the two, CI and CINT, are closely related.
Ideally, every person assigned to CI duties should be fully trained and certified by
some external authority (state or country) in which the person works. The training
should provide for a thorough back grounding in general intelligence technique, basic
analytical technique, rules, regulations, and laws pertaining to right to privacy.
As part of the CI member’s qualifications must be a reputation for honesty, high
moral standards, and a deep understanding of police work.
CI training should do more than make CI generalists out of attendees. To maximize
training benefits, graduates should return to the field with a certain degree of
knowledge regarding the specific suspect individual-group they will be encountering.
Ideally, the depth of the expertise should provide graduating attendees official
certification (and the resulting recognition) as experts (e.g., terrorism, organized
crime, narcotics and weapons trafficking)in their departments and in the courts, as well.
Regardless of where CI is physically located, its member(s) must be free to participate
in the jurisdiction’s greater needs when these needs include an entire state or country
(or RISS Project). Situations wherein several CI members from different agencies may
be required are terrorist acts, the movements of Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs, the travels
of Gypsy families, and a drug cartel’s threats against several intelligence officers.
In these situations, CI might consider developing target proposals, feeding misinformation
to informants, ferreting out government workers who have gone sour, and attempting to
turn gang members against one another.
Some operations do require the networking of CI personnel. When this occurs, CI
personnel from several agencies may be included in a task force. As a task force
composed of members from several contributing departments, staff must either identify
specific jurisdictional boundaries or combine CI assets under one management. This
ensures continuity of effort, the bringing together needed skills and equipment, and
the tendency to reduce duplication.
A number of damaging occurrences have occurred between either suspect individuals-groups
and the police(3) or between the department and its own personnel(4)
(5) who have gone bad. These past incidents demonstrate a need for the presence
of skilled CI operators. While there is not yet any evidence of harm coming to
police and their families because of leaks in data holdings, or penetrations by
moles of departments and/or their intelligence operations, these types of situations
could occur in the future.
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(1) A paper translated from 1990 Counterintelligence materials of the US Army.
(2) For the national police forces of countries now being victimized by major
terrorist activities (i.e., Egypt, India, etc) the installation of a well-trained
counterintelligence operation in the police service would likely provide some measurable
crime deterrence. Real and lasting benefits would only be recognized, however,
following several years of CI field experience and with the CI's development of
external networking and reporting procedures. For those countries now developing
criminal intelligence operations for their national police (Sweden, Finland, Iceland,
etc) the time is absolutely right for including the CI function in the initial design.
(3) South Australia police uncovered a plot by one outlaw motorcycle gang to
undermine the police anti-drug operations through threats against police family members.
Follow-up showed this particular gang was more sophisticated in their use of
counterintelligence then had been the police.
(4) In the late 1990s, the New York Police Department had an intelligence
officer who was on the payroll of the John Gotti organized crime mob. A skilled CI
might have uncovered this relationship before damage had been done. In the 1980s,
a lone intelligence officer inside the San Francisco Police Department was found to
have assisted a foreign government by using a free access to the most confidential
of his unit's internal documents.
(5) In the 1970s, the Los Angeles Police were slow to become aware of the
unauthorized removal of numerous packing boxes of file materials from their
intelligence operation. While removed, internal affairs officers determined the
documents had been given over to a private organization by the staff member.
Jack Morris is President of Palmer Enterprises, a company which specializes in books, training, and consulting devoted to criminal intelligence and counterintelligence
matters. He served as an administrator in the Bureau of Organized Crime and Criminal
Intelligence, California Department of Justice. He also served as Director of the
Intelligence Division, Criminal Justice Commission, Queensland, Australia. He has
a Masters in Public Administration from the University of Southern California at
Los Angeles and is an International Associate of the Australian Institute of
Professional Intelligence Officers. He currently serves on the Board of Directors
of the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, Inc.
The author welcomes comments and can be reached at this
CIA CRYPTOGRAPHY EXPERT ARRESTED FOR PASSING DATA TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
Suspect attempts blackmail of own CIA when caught and then...
Douglas Fred Groat, a 50-year-old former CIA cryptography expert who worked as an undercover operative abroad for more than a decade, was arrested by the FBI on 1 April. He is accused of passing classified information to two unspecified foreign governments, and attempting to procure $500,000 from the "Company" in exchange for his silence.
An ex-soldier and New York policeman before joining the CIA in 1980, Groat allegedly disclosed NSA/CIA methods of decoding other countries' secret encrypted communications in March and April last year, less than six months after being sacked by the CIA. He had been on "administrative leave" since 1993 and was
dismissed in autumn 1996.
The CIA has refused to reveal why Groat was sacked, or where he served overseas "because such details
might put US security at risk". Groat appeared before a Washington court after his arrest and entered a plea of not guilty to all charges.
The Chief Prosecutor, Eric Dubelier, told the court that the government would use classified information legislation to prevent the disclosure in the media of national security secrets.
Groat, in recent years, supposedly lived in "a recreational vehicle" all over the US to avoid being caught.
Groat was employed by the CIA from May 1980 until October 1996 as a "black bag" specialist (illegal entry and theft) for the CIA Science and Technology Directorate which includes the most secretive and closed-mouthed of the agency's spies who crack codes, break into buildings overseas to plant bugs and eavesdrop on telephone calls in specially-equipped vans parked near their targets.
Douglas Groat was placed on administrative leave during his last three years with the Agency. He apparently told two foreign countries, one thought to be Russia, that certain communications encryption systems they possessed had been compromised. Groat, however, was not a cryptographer and probably could not provide anything more than how code books were stolen or eavesdropping was carried out.
Groat was a loner. Born in 1948 in Niskayuna, New York, north of Albany, he graduated from Scotia High School, outside Schenectady, in 1965, enlisted in the US Army in 1967, was commissioned as a second lieutenant and left active duty as a captain in 1972, having served in the Special Forces. He attended at least three colleges before obtaining a bachelor's degree in liberal arts from the State University of New York in 1978. After leaving the Army and before joining the CIA, he held four different law-enforcement jobs in Glenville, New York, for the Schenectady County sheriff, and in Phoenix, Arizona.
Groat reportedly did not act out of ideology or greed against the CIA. His motivation was that of "pure revenge" according to the FBI. His former Glenville police officer colleagues had serious trouble with Groat for exactly the same reason: revenge for not being given the chief's job, for which some felt he had been both unqualified and incapable.
Officials would not say why Groat was originally put on leave, but by 1990, Groat was described as a man with a grudge, complaining bitterly that he deserved a promotion, that his chief was an idiot and that the way the CIA stole codes was all wrong. He reportedly refused to cooperate in investigating a botched operation in July 1990 in which he was involved in breaking into a foreign embassy overseas. The dispute lasted seven years with the FBI opening a counterintelligence investigation on Douglas Groat in 1993 after he refused to take a polygraph test related to the compromised operation. He was fired in 1996 for refusing to take the lie detector test and for taking classified information home.
Groat took his views through the chain of command, including to the agency's inspector general's
office. According to his former wife, he was patriotic, intelligent, never drank, never used drugs or protested against the Vietnam War. But being both a "straight arrow" and a "bag man" reveals a certain contradictory approach to life and his attempted extortion against the CIA, if true, was not a good career move.
- - - - - - - - - -
This article, while altered slightly by the editor, was made available to the Palmer bulletin by Olivier Schmidt whose commercial information sharing firm is described in the banner at the top of this page.
PEACE TIME BRINGS THE SPIES OUT IN FULL FORCE
Spies know no season and don't need war to spur them on
On 29 November, the US Navy announced that First Class Petty Officer, Daniel King, a
40-year-old code expert, was taken into military custody on 5 November in Quantico, Virginia.
He was charged with passing secrets to Russia in 1994.
Navy officials described King's security leak as "minimal", although he is charged with
passing top secret submarine intelligence information to Russians and disclosing classified
information to a co-worker.
The Russians reportedly did not solicit his ill-gotten information and King apparently
received no money for his black deeds. In spy terminology, King is a "walk-in" and hadn't been
transformed into an "agent" by the time of his arrest.
King's espionage took place while he worked in the Navy's espionage decoding unit at Fort
Meade, Maryland, and while associated with the National Security Agency. Supposedly,
King had mailed his secret information to the Russian Embassy in Washington.
King was described as a disgruntled officer who was passed over for promotion; he also had
serious marital problems. His records show he was promoted several times in his first seven
years of service, but remained at his current rank for the past eleven.
Charges were reportedly brought after he failed a lie detector test administered during a
routine security clearance investigation. When confronted with the results of the test, King
admitted passing secret information to Russia, but later retracted some details according
to military officials.
Other Spies Fall, too!
On 8 December, Stanislav Borisovich Gusev, a second secretary at the Russian Embassy in
Washington, was caught monitoring a listening device while electronically linked to a
bugging device planted in the State Department by some unknown person. He was taken into
custody just outside the State Department and has been ordered out of the country.
The bug to which Gusev had been listening was reportedly placed in a seventh-floor
conference room, a "highly sensitive" location, and one frequently used by senior department
policy-makers. The "extremely sophisticated device" was a battery-powered transmitter and
was professionally "introduced" into the State Department. Counterintelligence experts
are saying the bug would have taken extensive time and perhaps two visits to install.
FBI agents on routine surveillance saw Gusev, a known Russian agent, standing in the vicinity
of the State Department last summer. Almost every week, Gusev walked the streets surrounding
the building or parked his car nearby. The FBI notified the diplomatic service which
surveyed the building's interior and found "a listening and transmittal device" in the
conference room. The device was left in place and used to disseminate disinformation to the
The previous week, Russia ordered the expulsion of Cheri Leberknight, a second secretary in
the US Embassy political section in Moscow. She was accused of attempting to obtain
secret military information from a Russian citizen. The expulsion order came just hours
after the US Navy said it had charged King for passing secrets to Russia.
The above article (Intelligence, N.108, 13 December 1999, p.15) was substantially
recomposed from an item noted in the Intelligence bulletin to which Palmer subscribes.
INTELLIGENCE is a subscription
by-weekly bulletin serving the world's intelligence community since 1980. Its display here
was granted by its editor, OLIVIER SCHMIDT.
SPARTACUS AND INTELLIGENCE IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST ROME
Among our many concerns in the intelligence field is a strong interest in
intelligence history. There are lessons there of value to free societies today. Rose
Mary Sheldon of the Department of History of Norwich University in Vermont, has
written a piece called, "The Spartacus Rebellion: A Roman Intelligence Failure?"
(1) Here are a few excerpts from her article demonstrating the need for good
intelligence from ancient times onward.
Oddly enough, the Roman Republic, despite its great extent and power, failed to
develop a good intelligence service, Miss Sheldon writes. "The relationship between
intelligence gathering and national security was already clear in antiquity," she
says. "Ancient governments collected and analyzed intelligence to assure themselves
that their state would suffer no harm, nor their undertakings fail because their
statesmen and soldiers acted in ignorance... While Near Eastern monarchies developed
elaborate intelligence services, western democracies and republics did not.
"The Romans," Miss Sheldon continues, "despite their formidable reputation for
organization and military successes, never developed a centralized intelligence
service during the Republic...no formal communications system, no professional
intelligence officers, and no system to coordinate the collection, analysis and
dissemination of intelligence... By not acting on accurate intelligence, the
Romans...suffered defeats...[and] a costly waste of manpower."
In 73 B.C. Spartacus, the Thracian gladiator-slave and former Roman soldier led a
revolt of 70 men to escape their treatment at the gladiator school where they were
held. The Romans, of course, reacted with force but Spartacus was prepared. According
to Miss Sheldon, "intelligence gathering stands out important part of Spartacus'
modus operandi. His reconnaissance force detected the approach of the Romans, and
even reported on the lax discipline among the opposing troops." The gladiators
surprised and routed the Roman force.
"In the first round of intelligence warfare, the Romans suffered an early and shameful
defeat," Miss Sheldon says. The rebellious slaves became an army. Rome's initial
response was weak and uncoordinated but after repeated defeats it then overreacted.
"There was suddenly a geometrical rise in the level of response from one praetor with
a half legion to two consuls with four legions," the author recounts. Yet,
despite the greater force of the pursuers, Spartacus was able to divide and defeat
them. "Because of the superior tactical intelligence, and his own skill and bravery,
Spartacus had beaten the veterans of four legions and both consuls," Miss Sheldon
Spartacus was also wise in the ways of counterintelligence. "A steady stream
of Roman deserters offered themselves to him," according to the author. "But Spartacus
refused to let such men join up...aware of the security problem this might cause.
The presence of a Roman 'mole' in his camp might rob him of his ability to surprise
"...The slaves, fighting from a position of weakness, knew intuitively that
intelligence would give them the edge," Miss Sheldon declares. They won numerous
battles. In the end, of course, they were overwhelmed. Twelve thousand slaves were
killed in the battle at Petelia (71 B.C.) and 6,000 survivors "were crucified
along the Appian Way from Capua to Rome."
Spartacus' intelligence successes and Roman failures, beyond instruction in the
areas of collection and analysis of information, give us another important lesson.
Marxists in our own century have tried to draw propaganda lessons from the Spartacus
revolt but Miss Sheldon would deny them their propaganda themes.
"Numerous studies have tried to show religious, political, social and economic
motives, but all of these are built on elaborate speculation," she says. "The heroic
leader of the social revolution against a corrupt, capitalist Roman world may have
been motivated by nothing more ideological than breaking the bonds of his own
In any case, "chaos caused by misinformation and mismanagement...the appearance
of 'great men' with their private armies...the perception that government was
increasingly unable to guarantee security to its citizens," might have been prevented
by a good intelligence system on the part of Rome. That lesson should be heeded today,
(1) SHELDON, Rose Mary. "The Spartacus Rebellion: A Roman Intelligence
Failure?" The International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol.6
Lawrence B. Sulc
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